# 1NC vs Science Fiction

### This 1NC may be a double turn—pick one

### Topicality

#### Interpretation—the affirmative must defend the implementation of a post-fiat policy option about banning speech codes on campus

#### “Resolved” implies action from a legislative body

#### Parcher 1 Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, <http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)>

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. [means] To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in original) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Vote Neg—

#### Procedural Fairness—they justify a limitless amount of unpredictable positions because they could defend anything since there is no floor on what their advocacy should be—also destroys negative ground because we don’t get access to generic DA’s and post fiat reasons why the aff is bad.

#### Fairness is a voter and outweighs

#### Galloway 7: Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

#### Additionally, fairness is a prior question to evaluating the truth claims of the aff—means they don’t get to weigh the case against T because we can’t know if their claims are true if they’re structurally un-debateable to begin with.

#### Education—Policy-making is the most important form of education we receive from debate

#### Shaw 01 [Carolyn M. Shaw, “Pedagogy in International Studies: Using Role-Play Scenarios in the IR Classroom: An Examination of Exercises on Peacekeeping Operations and Foreign Policy Decision Making.” Wichita State University. 2001.]

The use ofrole-playing in the classroom provides an alternative method for presenting [a] course materials in contrast to lecturing. Although some materials can be conveyed well through an oral presentation, manyconcepts in international relations only become less abstract when the student can apply them directly or experience them personally (Preston, 2000). ‘‘To the extent that [students] engage in constructing new knowledge or reconstructing given information, rather than simply memorizing it, they gain a deeper understanding’’ (King, 1994:16). Merryﬁeld and Remy (1995:8) similarly note that ‘‘students master content not only by being exposed to information through readings and lectures...but also by engaging in a reﬂective process in which they make the information their own by evaluating and using it.’’ Since class trips abroad are beyond the scope of most courses, simulations can be used to place students in a uniqueinternational context orposition which they would otherwise be unable to experience, and give them the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the material. One challenge that instructors face is the trade-off in terms of coverage of material and the time it takes to conduct an active learning exercise. Such exercises usually take more time than covering the same materials in lecture format (Boyer et al., 2000:4). The key to using role-playing effectively without sacriﬁcing too much content is to plan the exercise carefully to provide interactive examples of the course materials. Frequently this can be done in coordination with a preparatory lecture. The concepts can be introduced prior to the exercise, and then participation in the exercise provides the students with concrete examples of more abstract theories and ideas presented in the lecture**.** For example,[I.E.] when learning about the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making, students are often frustrated that the government actors involved cannot simply ‘‘reach a consensual agreement and do what’s best for our country.’’ By actually taking on the roles of the different agencies involved in foreign policy making, students beginto understand the underlyingconﬂicts between these actors and thechallenge of clearly deﬁning what is in our ‘‘national interest.’’

1. **T version—Sci-Fi demands political advocacy—their criticism means nothing unless it presents a specific point of controversy—this card is ridiculous**

**Meadows 14:** Foz Meadows. May 1st, 2014. Huffington Post. “Poltiics Belongs in Science Fiction”. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/foz-meadows/politics-belong-in-scienc_b_5246418.html>. RW

Writing in last week’s USA Today, Glenn Harlan Reynolds has made a case for why he feels that [politics don’t belong in science fiction](http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/28/hugo-awards-science-fiction-reading-politics-larry-correia-column/8282843/). He begins: There was a time when science fiction was a place to explore new ideas, free of the conventional wisdom of staid, “mundane” society, a place where speculation replaced group think, and where writers as different as libertarian-leaning [Robert Heinlein](http://www.heinleinsociety.org/CentennialReader/robert.html), and left-leaning [Isaac Asimov](http://www.nndb.com/people/702/000023633/) and [Arthur Clarke](http://www.economist.com/node/10918055) would share readers, magazines, and conventions. Ignoring momentarily the inference that science fiction is no longer a place to explore new ideas, I find it immediately telling that, in trying to demonstrate the former scope and variety of politics in SFF, Reynolds has chosen to make his case by naming three white Anglophone men, all of whom began their careers a good 20-odd years [before Jim Crow was repealed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Crow_laws), [before women became legally entitled](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_Pay_Act_of_1963) to [equal pay](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_Pay_Act_1970), and [before homosexuality](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sodomy_law#United_Kingdom) was [decriminalized](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sodomy_laws_in_the_United_States#Federal_law). While race, gender and sexual orientation certainly don’t predetermine one’s political affiliations, it seems pointedly relevant that, during the Golden Age of SF, the prevailing laws and social conditions in the UK and the USA both made a certain type of visible dissent — or rather, visible dissent by a certain type of person — if not impossible, then certainly very difficult, regardless of the forum. What Reynolds sees as intellectual harmony, a sort of friendly détente between men who held very different political opinions, is, in fact, the end result of a system which privileged the works, views and personhood of men like them so far above the contributions of everyone else as to skew the results beyond usefulness. Golden Age SF wasn’t apolitical, and nor were its writers; rather, both were the products of an intensely political process. So when Reynolds notes sadly of the Hugo Awards that “in recent years critics have accused the award process — and much of science fiction fandom itself — of becoming politicized,” his claim that it was never political before is fundamentally inaccurate. Rather, science fiction fandom, which has always been political, is now visibly so, not only because groups previously prevented from speaking out, whether legally or through social coercion, are now increasingly free to do so, but because the fan conversation is no longer restricted by factors like physical distance or the preferences of gatekeepers. Just as the Internet allows Reynolds to post his criticism of modern SFF online, so it allows me to post this criticism of him: in that, we are perfectly equal. Reynolds, however, seems not to think so: That’s certainly been the experience of [Larry Correia](http://monsterhunternation.com/about/), who was [nominated](http://www.tor.com/blogs/2014/04/announcing-the-2014-hugo-award-nominees) for a Hugo this year. Correia, the author of numerous highly successful science fiction books like[Monster Hunter International](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1439132852/ref=as_li_tf_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=211189&creative=373489&creativeASIN=1439132852&link_code=as3&tag=insta0c-20)and [Hard Magic](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1451638248/ref=as_li_tf_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=211189&creative=373489&creativeASIN=1451638248&link_code=as3&tag=insta0c-20), is getting a lot of flak because he’s a right-leaning libertarian. This is, to put it mildly, a drastic misrepresentation of the objections to Correia’s nomination, foremost among which is his prominent association with and support for Vox Day, aka Theodore Beale, a man [who recently said](http://fozmeadows.wordpress.com/2013/06/14/reconciliation-a-response-to-theodore-beale/) of one of SFF’s most prominent and popular authors, N. K. Jemisin, who is African American, that: “...We do not view her as being fully civilised... those self-defence laws [like Stand Your Ground in Flordia] have been put in place to let whites defend themselves by shooting people like her, who are savages in attacking white people... [she is] an educated, but ignorant, savage with no more understanding of what it took to build a new literature... than an illiterate Igbotu tribesman has of how to build a jet engine.” Vox/Beale has similarly argued that the Taliban shooting of Malala Yousafzai was “[perfectly rational and scientifically justifiable](http://wehuntedthemammoth.com/2013/10/23/vox-day-the-talibans-attempt-to-silence-malala-yousafzai-was-perfectly-rational-and-scientifically-justifiable/comment-page-3/),” because of “the strong correlation between female education and demographic decline” — that is, because educating women leads to social decay. He [also believes](http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Theodore_Beale) that homosexuality is a birth defect, that there’s a link between race and intelligence, and that it’s “an established empirical fact” that “raping and killing a woman is demonstrably more attractive to women than behaving like a gentleman.” It is for sentiments like these — or rather, [his decision to publicize them using the official SFWA twitter feed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Beale#Conflict_with_and_expulsion_from_SFWA) — that lead to Vox/Beale’s expulsion from the SFWA last year; a decision which his supporters persist in seeing as gross left-wing censorship and, to borrow Reynolds’s term, groupthink, rather than the native consequence of misusing an organization’s public platform as a vehicle for bigotry against its other members. How, then, does all this tie in to Correia and the Hugo Awards? Because, in the lead up to the announcement of this year’s Hugo Award shortlist, Vox/Beale and Correia collaborated on the promotion of what they called the Sad Puppy Slate: a list of nominees, including themselves — most of whom, it must be noted, actually made it onto the short list, including Vox/Beale — that was specifically intended to prove a political point: namely, that despite the criticism folks like Correia receive from the more left-leaning quarters of SFF fandom, they still ultimately sold more books, and could therefore get on the ballot if they wanted. While there has been considerable debate and outrage about their approach to garnering votes — as, indeed, there is every year, accusations of logrolling, ballot-stuffing and gratuitous self-promotion being par for the course from all corners — ultimately, what Correia and Vox/Beale did was legal. Nonetheless, the backlash against Correia isn’t, as Reynolds would have it, simply because he’s the inoffensive holder of a particular political stance, but because he has actively thrown his support behind an openly misogynistic white supremacist. To therefore suggest, as Reynolds has done, that the criticism Correia has subsequently received is political, while his Sad Puppy Slate — which was explicitly intended to make a political point — was not, is not just inaccurate, but wilfully misleading. The idea that politics are only unwelcome when they challenge the entrenched or dominant powers of society, rather than supporting them, is itself a defensive strategy of dominant politics: a way of conditioning us to believe that politics so normative as to be rendered invisible are simply apolitical defaults, and that any attempt to change, challenge or define them is not only political, but evidence of a political conspiracy — of groupthink, even — so vast and all-consuming as to be the real dominant power. Says Reynolds: Purging the heretics, usually but not always from the left, has become a popular game in a lot of institutions. It just seems worse in science fiction because SF was traditionally open and optimistic about the future, two things that purging the heretics doesn’t go with very well. The backlash against Vox/Beale and Correia isn’t about “purging the heretics”: it’s legitimate criticism of a man who both believes in, and is a political advocate for, the active disenfranchisement and lesser worth of the vast majority of humans on the planet, and a discussion about why SFF, as a community that includes a rather large number of such humans, is best served by supporting them instead. Correia has thrown his lot in with Vox/Beale in a campaign which, by his own admission, was less about the quality of nominated works than their ability to provoke those with different politics; to try and then argue that such works should be judged separately from the politics which helped to nominate them, let alone the politics of their content, is a hypocritical insincerity of the highest order. Science fiction both is, and always has been, a political genre. When we tell stories about a future in outer space populated entirely by white people, who constitute a global minority; when we describe societies set a hundred, three hundred, a thousand years in the future but which still lack gender equality, and whose sexual mores mimic those of the 1950s, that is no less a political decision than choosing to write diversely. The political influence on a given community is not restricted solely to those whose politics are made visible by their difference to your own. Swimming against the current might draw more attention, but it doesn’t negate what’s trying to pull you under. Of necessity, the politics of science fiction are reflective of the political climate in which it’s written — why else do we speculate about the future, but that we’re concerned with the present? Politics belong in science fiction, Mr. Reynolds, because it is written both by and about people, and you cannot have one without the other. By all means, criticise a particular strain of politics — criticise context and method and history, result and aim and consequence — but not the fact that politics are involved at all; and especially not when one side is advocating for equal treatment and representation, while the other is saying their gender, race or sexual orientation voids their right to it. It really is that simple.

#### Drop the debater to set a precedent for future debates—drop the arg is dropping the 1AC, so they lose anyway

**Prefer competing interpretations because reasonability creates a race to the bottom which encourages sub-par interpretations—it’s also arbitrary and invites judge intervention**

**NO RVI**

**1. Burdens: T is an already aff burden – winning that the aff is topical doesn’t mean you should automatically win. That model of debate would logically grant auto-wins to the aff each time which is incoherent—logical justifications come first because our arguments need to make sense before we can justify them theoretically**

**2. Forces Theory: RVI’s force every theory debate to ignore substance since both debaters generate offense on the highest layer. This explodes time skew but also destroys substantive education**

**3. Chills Theory: RVI’s discourage debaters from checking abuse since the abusive debaters can just be prepped well on their abusive practices and bait theory – the prep skew is already in the cheater’s favor, so it’s almost impossible to win**

### 1NC- Baudrillard

#### Welcome to the ecstasy of communication—free speech is overwhelmed by the saturation of networks with an incessant circulation of hyper-visible signs

**Baudrillard 87**

Jean Baudrillard (cultural critic). “The Ecstasy of Communication.” 1987. <http://www.brianschrank.com/Intro_to_Media_Studies/resources/Ecstasy.pdf>

\*\*ellipses in original

We are no longer a part of the drama of alienation; we live in the ecstasy of communication. And this ecstasy is obscene. The obscene is what does away with every mirror, every look, every image. The obscene put an end to every representation. But it is not only the sexual that becomes obscene in pornography; today there is a whole pornography of information and communication, that is to say, of circuits and networks, a pornography of all functions and objects in their readability, their fluidity, their availability, their regulation, in their forced signification, in their performativity, in their branching, in their polyvalence, in their free expression….It is no longer the traditional obscenity of what is hidden, repressed, forbidden or obscure; on the contrary, it is the obscenity of the visible, of the all-too-visible, of the more-visible-than-the-visible. It is the obscenity of what no longer has any secret, of what dissolves completely in information and communication. Marx set forth and denounced the obscenity of the commodity, and this obscenity was lined to its equivalence, to the abject principle of free circulation, beyond all use value of the object. The obscenity of the commodity stems from the fact that it is abstract, formal and light in opposition to the weight, opacity and substance of the object. The commodity is readable: in opposition to the object, which never completely gives up its secret, the commodity always manifests its visible essence, which is its price. It is the formal place of transcription of all possible objects; through it, objects communicate. Hence, the commodity form is the first great medium of the modern world. But the message that the objects deliver through it is always extremely simplified, and it is always the same: their exchange value. Thus at bottom the message already no longer exists; it is the medium that imposes itself in its pure circulation. This is what I call (potentially) ecstasy. One has only to prolong this Marxist analysis, or push it to the second or third power, to grasp the transparence and obscenity of the universe of communication, which leaves far behind it those relative analyses of the universe of the commodity. All functions abolished in a single dimension, that of communication. That’s the ecstasy of communication. All secrets, spaces and scenes abolished in a single dimension of information. That’s obscenity. The hot, sexual obscenity of former times is succeeded by the cold and communicational, contractual and motivational obscenity of today. The former clearly implied a type of promiscuity, but it was organic, like the body’s viscera, or again like objects piled up and accumulated in a private universe, or like all that is not spoken, teeming in the silence of repression. Unlike this organic, visceral, carnal promiscuity, the promiscuity that reigns over the communication networks is one of superficial saturation, of an incessant solicitation, of an extermination of interstitial and protective spaces. I pick up my telephone receiver and it’s all there; the whole marginal network catches and harasses me with the insupportable good faith of everything that wants and claims to communicate. Free radio: it speaks, it sings, it expresses itself. Very well, it is the sympathetic obscenity of its content. In terms a little different for each medium, this is the result: a space, that of the FM band, is found to be saturated, the stations overlap and mix together (to the point that sometimes it no longer communicates at all). Something that was free by virtue of space is no longer. Speech is free perhaps, but I am less free than before: I no longer succeed in knowing what I want, the space is so saturated, the pressure so great from all who want to make themselves heard. I fall into the negative ecstasy of the radio.

**Science fiction is but another effort to mask the implosion of the hyper real—their attempted projection of meaning onto alternate realities feeds the production of simulacra**

**Evans 91 on Baudrillard:** Arthur B. Evans. Translating Jean Baudrillard’s “Science Fiction Studies: Volume 18, Part 3”. November 1991. <http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/55/baudrillard55art.htm>. RW

There is no real and no imaginary except at a certain distance. What happens when this distance, even the one separating the real from the imaginary, begins to disappear and to be absorbed by the model alone? Currently, from one order of simulacra to the next, we are witnessing the reduction and absorption of this distance, of this separation which permits a space for ideal or critical projection. It is at a maximum in utopias, where a transcendent world, a radically different universe, is portrayed (its most individualized form remains the Romantic dream, wherein transcendence is represented in all its depth, even unto its subconscious structure; but, in all cases, the separation from the real world is maximal—it is the utopian island in contrast to the continent of the real). It is diminished considerably in SF: SF only being, most often, an extravagant projection of, but qualitatively not different from, the real world of production. Extrapolations of mechanics or energy, velocities or powers approaching infinity—SF's fundamental patterns and scenarios are those of mechanics, of metallurgy, and so forth. Projective hypostasis of the robot. (In the limited universe of the pre-Industrial era, utopias counterposed an ideal alternative world. In the potentially limitless universe of the production era, SF adds by multiplying the world's own possibilities.) It is totally reduced in the implosive era of models. Models no longer constitute an imaginary domain with reference to the real; they are, themselves, an apprehension of the real, and thus leave no room for any fictional extrapolation—they are immanent, and therefore leave no room for any kind of transcendentalism. The stage is now set for simulation, in the cybernetic sense of the word—that is to say, for all kinds of manipulation of these models (hypothetical scenarios, the creation of simulated situations, etc.), but now nothing distinguishes this management-manipulation from the real itself: **there is no more fiction**. Reality was able to surpass fiction, the surest sign that the imaginary has possibly been outpaced. But the real could never surpass the model, for the real is only a pretext of the model. The imaginary was a pretext of the real in a world dominated by the reality principle. Today, it is the real which has become the pretext of the model in a world governed by the principle of simulation. And, paradoxically, it is the real which has become our true utopia—but a utopia that is no longer a possibility, a utopia we can do no more than dream about, like a lost object. Perhaps the SF of this era of cybernetics and hyperreality will only be able to attempt to "artificially" resurrect the "historical" worlds of the past, trying to reconstruct in vitro and down to its tiniest details the various episodes of bygone days: events, persons, defunct ideologies—all now empty of meaning and of their original essence, but hypnotic with retrospective truth. Like the Civil War in Philip K. Dick's The Simulacra; like a gigantic hologram in three dimensions, where fiction will never again be a mirror held to the future, but rather a desperate rehallucinating of the past. **We can no longer imagine other universes**; and the gift of transcendence has been taken from us as well. Classic SF was one of expanding universes: it found its calling in narratives of space exploration, coupled with more terrestrial forms of exploration and colonization indigenous to the 19th and 20th centuries. There is no cause-effect relationship to be seen here. Not simply because, today, terrestrial space has been virtually completely encoded, mapped, inventoried, saturated; has in some sense been shrunk by globalization; has become a collective marketplace not only for products but also for values, signs, and models, thereby leaving no room any more for the imaginary. It is not exactly because of all this that the exploratory universe (technical, mental, cosmic) of SF has also stopped functioning. But the two phenomena are closely linked, and they are two aspects of the same general evolutionary process: a period of implosion, after centuries of explosion and expansion. When a system reaches its limits, its own saturation point, a reversal begins to takes place. And something happens also to the imagination. Until now, we have always had large reserves of the imaginary, because the coefficient of reality is proportional to the imaginary, which provides the former with its specific gravity. This is also true of geographical and space exploration: when there is no more virgin ground left to the imagination, when the map covers all the territory, something like the reality principle disappears. The conquest of space constitutes, in this sense, an irreversible threshold which effects the loss of terrestrial coordinates and referentiality. Reality, as an internally coherent and limited universe, begins to hemorrhage when its limits are stretched to infinity. The conquest of space, following the conquest of the planet, promotes either the de-realizing of human space, or the reversion of it into a simulated hyperreality. Witness, for example, this two-room apartment with kitchen and bath launched into orbit with the last Moon capsule (raised to the power of space, one might say); the perceived ordinariness of a terrestrial habitat then assumes the values of the cosmic and its hypostasis in Space, the satellization of the real in the transcendence of Space—it is the end of metaphysics, the end of fantasy, the end of SF. The era of hyperreality has begun. From this point on, something must change: the projection, the extrapolation, this sort of pantographic exuberance which made up the charm of SF are now no longer possible. It is no longer possible to manufacture the unreal from the real, to create the imaginary from the data of reality. The process will be rather the reverse: to put in place "decentered" situations, models of simulation, and then to strive to give them the colors of the real, the banal, the lived; to reinvent the real as fiction, precisely because the real has disappeared from our lives. A hallucination of the real, of the lived, of the everyday—but reconstituted, sometimes even unto its most disconcertingly unusual details, recreated like an animal park or a botanical garden, presented with transparent precision, but totally lacking substance, having been derealized and hyperrealized. True SF, in this case, would not be fiction in expansion, with all the freedom and "naïveté" which gave it a certain charm of discovery. It would, rather, evolve implosively, in the same way as our image of the universe. It would seek to revitalize, to reactualize, to rebanalize fragments of simulation—fragments of this universal simulation which our presumed "real" world has now become for us. But where can one find fictional works which already incorporate this condition of reversion? Clearly, the short stories of Philip K. Dick "gravitate," one might say, in this new space (although it can no longer be expressed as such because, in fact, this new universe is "anti-gravitational," or, if it still gravitates, it does so around the hole of the real, around the hole of the imaginary). Dick does not create an alternate cosmos nor a folklore or a cosmic exoticism, nor intergalactic heroic deeds; the reader is, from the outset, in a total simulation without origin, past, or future—in a kind of flux of all coordinates (mental, spatio-temporal, semiotic). It is not a question of parallel universes, or double universes, or even of possible universes: not possible nor impossible, nor real nor unreal. It is hyperreal. It is a universe of simulation, which is something altogether different. And this is so not because Dick speaks specifically of simulacra. SF has always done so, but it has always played upon the double, on artificial replication or imaginary duplication, whereas here the double has disappeared. There is no more double; one is always already in the other world, an other world which is not another, without mirrors or projection or utopias as means for reflection. The simulation is impassable, unsurpassable, checkmated, without exteriority. We can no longer move "through the mirror" to the other side, as we could during the golden age of transcendence. Perhaps an even more convincing example would be Ballard and his fictional evolution from his earliest "fantasmagorical" short stories—poetic, dream-like, alienating—to Crash, which (even more than High Rise or Concrete Island) constitutes without doubt the contemporary model for this SF which is no longer SF. Crash is our world, nothing is really "invented" therein, everything is hyper-functional: traffic and accidents, technology and death, sex and the camera eye. Everything is like a huge simulated and synchronous machine; an acceleration of our own models, of all the models which surround us, all mixed together and hyper-operationalized in the void. What distinguishes Crash from almost all other SF, which still seem to revolve around the old (mechanical/mechanistic) duo of function vs. dysfunction, is that it projects into the future along the same lines of force and the same finalities as those of the "normal" universe. Fiction can go beyond reality (or inversely, which is more subtle), but according to the same rules of the game. But in Crash, there is neither fiction nor reality—a kind of hyperreality has abolished both. And therein lies the defining character, if there is one, of our contemporary SF. The same may be said, for example, of Bug Jack Barron or of certain passages in Stand on Zanzibar. In point of fact, SF of this sort is no longer an elsewhere, it is an everywhere: in the circulation of models here and now, in the very axiomatic nature of our simulated environment. What SF author, for instance, would have "imagined" (although, to be precise, this is no longer "imaginable") the "reality" of West German simulacra-factories, factories which rehire unemployed people in all the roles and all the positions of the traditional manufacturing process, but who produce nothing, whose only activity involves chain-of-command games, competition, memos, account sheets, etc., all within a huge network? All material production is duplicated in a void (one of these simulacra-factories even went into "real" bankruptcy, laying off a second time its own unemployed workers). This, indeed, is simulation: not that these factories are fake, but that they are real—or hyperreal—and that, by being so, they send all "real" production, that of "serious" factories, into the same hyperreality. What is fascinating here is not the opposition of fake factories/real factories, but rather the indistinction between the two: the fact that all the rest of production has no more referentiality or profound finality than this "business simulacrum." It's the hyperrealist indifference that constitutes the true "science-fictional" quality of this episode. And one can see that there is no need to invent it: it is here before us, rising out of a world without secrets, without depth. Doubtlessly the most difficult thing today, in the complex universe of SF, is to be able to discern what still corresponds (and this is a large part of it) to the imaginary of the second order, the productive/projective order, and what is already arising from this indistinction of the imaginary, from this flux deriving from the third order of simulation. One can, for example, clearly discern the difference between machine robot-mechanics (characteristic of the second order) and cybernetic machines like computers whi[c](http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/55/baudrillard55art.htm#baudrillardcrash)h derive axiomatically from the third. 1NC- Baudrillard

#### The impact is psychic death—the affirmative is locked within contemporary culture, which depletes our vitality

**Ruti 10**

Mari Ruti (professor of critical theory at the University of Toronto). *A World of Fragile Things: Psychoanalysis and the Art of Living*. SUNY Press. March 25th, 2010. Google Books, pgs. 30-31.

It is worth noting right away that where traditional accounts of the art of living talked about cultivating a self—about improving and refining the self’s character to meet an elevated ideal—the contemporary pursuit of authenticity is often couched in terms of recovering a core or kernel of being that has gotten lost in the turmoil of living. That is, where the philosophical art of living aimed to activate the subject’s capacity to become a more fully realized version of itself, to reach potentialities that exceeded its current configuration of traits, the contemporary notion of authenticity asks the subject to become what it already, deep down, is. Where the art of living in its older forms often deemed certain character traits and aptitudes more esteemed than others, the contemporary culture of authenticity pursues the “truth” of the individual’s being without much attention to the quality of the characteristics that constitute this “truth.” In effect, where the traditional art of living was designed to rid the subject of certain disagreeable or undesirable attributes—or, as in Nietzsche, at the very least to transform such attributes into valuable ingredients of a refined whole—for the current culture of authenticity the important thing is less what the self is like than that the self gets to be what it, in some inherent sense, already is. The contemporary cult of authenticity, in other words, has largely lost sight of the notion of the self as an ongoing process, upholding instead a static vision of essential traits. It is perhaps not altogether surprising that present-day subjectivity is haunted by the fear that the self’s essence can be buried, that genuineness and sincerity are somehow in short supply. Though the masks and personas of social life may not be any more artificial now than they were in earlier times, there is arguably something about the contemporary cultural moment—a moment characterized by an unrelenting exposure to external stimulation, multiple demands on our time and attention, an accelerated pace of life, a surface-oriented tone of personal interactions, and a fragmentation of communal space—that makes it demanding to fend off the sensation of personal inauthenticity. While our culture (sometimes deservedly, sometimes not) prides itself on its unprecedented fluidity and versatility—the fact that it allows for a diversity of existential styles to coexist in a heterogeneous space—it is also one of the hallmarks of this culture to deplete our vitality and put us on the defensive. As Jean Baudrillard conjectures, “Speech is free perhaps, but I am less free than before: I no longer succeed in knowing what I want, the space is so saturated, the pressure so great from all who want to make themselves heard.” Contemporary culture is vibrant, but at its worst it can scatter us in so many directions that we come to feel overwhelmingly disjointed. Paradoxically, we come to feel so frantically alive—agitated and overstimulated—that we die inside. This suggests that aliveness comes in various forms and that not all of these forms are equally conducive to psychic well-being.

#### Universities have ceased to be institutions of meaning—the system is destined to implode because of the dissemination of signs which swallow the real

**Robinson 12**

Andrew Robinson (political activist from the UK). “Jean Baudrillard: Hyperreality and Implosion.” Ceasefire Magazine. August 10th, 2012. <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-9/>

Implosion Baudrillard’s account of a functionally-obsessed code does not conclude with a smoothly functioning totality. The system which results depends on the constant maintenance of a regime of control. **Such a system is very unstable, open to collapsing at the slightest rupture.** For instance, systems of power depend on a master-signifier, which is ultimately arbitrary and contingent. (There is no longer a master-signifier of the entire system, but agencies such as states and companies still have leaders for example). When it is obvious that it is arbitrary and contingent, power is unpinned from its apparent obviousness. It comes to seem purely arbitrary, and this interferes with its functioning. When power occupies the empty place of power, it comes to seem obscene, impure and ridiculous, and eventually collapses. **Baudrillard refers to this instability as implosion.** This means that he sees the system collapsing from within. The system is no longer expanding – hence the turn to deterrence instead of war. It is in ‘involution’ – collapsing in upon itself. For Baudrillard, the system has reached its culmination. It is accelerating towards its limit, which today is expressed as implosion (rather than explosion or revolution). The growing density of simulations is destroying it. Implosion is swallowing all the energy of the real. Implosion is similar to the idea of ‘internal contradictions’ in Marxism. It refers to a tendency to collapse arising from the system’s own dynamics. Implosion arises from the destruction of meaning and the reality-effect due to the precession of simulacra. The problem for the system is that signs need a separate reality in order to refer to something, and hence to function as signs. In the current regime of simulation, social realities are generated from signs and models which precede them. The model produces the “real”, the medium, and the message all at once. **Reality separate from the regime is either destroyed, denied, or incorporated**. As a result, the signs stop referring to anything. At the same time, therefore, a total system of meaning is created, and its **meaningfulness is destroyed**. All signs or referentials are combined in a vicious circle or Moebius strip. **Truth, equivalences, rational distinctions break down**. Without a clear outside or referent, the reality-effect breaks down. Without a focus of intensity, meaning breaks down. Meaning can no longer be pinned-down in particular places. It circulates at increased speed, without any referent or guarantee. For instance, economic growth is increasingly unstable. Economic bubbles form and burst, commodities (such as Internet companies or real-estate) are immensely valued and then collapse, emerging “tigers” from Korea to Ireland to Mexico suffer sharp collapses. Baudrillard sees the same thing happening with everything from fashion to art to politics. **The problem is structural**. Once the system reaches saturation, it starts to fall in on itself, like a black hole. Saturation leads to inertia. For Baudrillard, global cities have already become black holes, eating up past social phenomena and meanings. They are entirely functional zones, arranged around sites such as hypermarkets (massive supermarkets), shopping centres and transport networks. The system is based on functionality. Yet in hypermarkets and modern universities, functions seem to become indeterminate – hence cities seem to disintegrate. This is because they have lost their distinct purposes or use-values. They become polyfunctional black-boxes with different input-output combinations. Usefulness is itself an ideology, which relies on the simulation of shortage or the creation of artificial scarcity. It is actually a moral convention, not a fact of nature. Today, supermarkets are also insurance companies, banks, pharmacists, government information dispensers, home-delivery services; today’s universities are also corporate research subcontractors, vocational trainers, immigration monitors, producers of brand-name merchandise, profiteers on debts, affiliates of regional development councils, housing providers, monitors of student dissent… This kind of hyper-functionalism renders them almost functionless – they can no longer be defined by a particular core function. They become a means without end. An operationalism without specific functions. All the different functions become simultaneous, without past, future or distinction. All mental, temporal, spatial and signalled coordinates become interchangeable in the simulated world. Hence, institutions cease to be related to specific functions, and cease to be believable as guarantors of meaning. This has social effects. Power has ceased to believe in the university. Degrees no longer have the value they once did. Like work, they persist on the basis of a dead referential, as a simulation. **The real function of these functionless institutions is deterrence** (see below). Their hyperreality, their simulation of functions, neutralises the surrounding territory. People won’t notice the absence of education when there’s a “world-class” university next-door. And if they do, they won’t feel they can compete with such a monolith. There are, of course, exceptions, but on the whole, **such simulations shut down social life.**

#### The alternative is to endorse symbolic, revolutionary media which, through exchange, disrupts the non-responsive nature of communication

**Merrin 5**

\*\*note: Merrin is summarizing Baudrillard and does not agree with this argument.

William Merrin (Senior Lecturer in Media Studies, department of political and cultural studies at Swansea University). *Baudrillard and the Media: A Critical Introduction*. 2005. Google Books, pgs. 19-21.

THE GIFT OF SPEECH With this background we can identify the existence in Baudrillard of a Durkheimian theory of human relations and communication. Formulated as the symbolic, this serves as the basis for his critique not only of our semiotic society but also of our electronic media which, for him, constitute one of the primary sites for the production and dissemination of the sign. The emphasis on the form of media and its effects immediately highlights the influence of Marshall McLuhan and his claim that ‘the medium is the message’ (1994:7), that the real message or significance of a medium is the technology itself and its psychic and social consequences (1994:4). Baudrillard employs this insight in his own critical project to argue that the most important effect of the electronic media is the transformation of the symbolic into the semiotic. ‘In their very form and very operation’, he argues, ‘the media induce a social relation’: one that involves ‘the abstraction, separation and abolition of exchange itself’ (RM, 169). Thus, if we understand communication from this Durkheimian perspective as ‘an exchange…a reciprocal space of a speech and a response’ (RM, 169), then it is this communication that is explicitly lost in our contemporary media. As Baudrillard argues, their form is one of ‘non-communication’, being based on the abolition of the symbolic relationship and its communication. Baudrillard’s critique of communication also operates as a critical of established positions within media theory. His arguments were directly aimed at Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s essay, ‘Constituents of a theory of the media’ (1970), which attempted to recover communication for Marxism, opposing its reduction to a superstructural effect and rethinking it as a productive force which could be liberated for democratic use (RM, 166-9). In contrast, Baudrillard rejects such hopes for a mediated communality, arguing that they abolish rather than promote human relations. ‘Media ideology operates at the level of form’, he argues, in the ‘separation’ of humanity it produces (RM, 169). Alongside a critique of Enzensberger, Baudrillard also targets the ‘communication theory’ formalized by Jacobsen and its picture of isolated poles of ‘transmitted’ and ‘receiver’, artificially reunited by a ‘message’ (RM, 178). This is ‘a simulation model of communication’, he says, excluding the scene of the symbolic: ‘the reciprocity and antagonism of interlocutors, and the ambivalence of their exchange’ (RM, 179). Real communication, Baudrillard says, involves more than ‘the simple transmission-reception of a message’ (RM, 169). Our media, however, follow this model, constituting a ‘speech without response’ (RM, 170), locking us into a unilateral power relation. Thus no liberation of the media is possible. For Baudrillard the only revolution ‘lies in restoring the possibility of a response’, allowing speech to ‘be able to exchange, give and repay itself’, though this would require ‘an upheaval in the entire existing structure of media’ (RM, 170). Baudrillard finds this model of ‘non-response’ reproduced throughout our society (RM, 170), in the unilaterality of the media, of semiotic consumption, of the hyperrealized image that leaves no room for investment, phantasy or response (Seduction (Sed.), 30), and in the west’s ‘non-wars’ that employ overwhelming technological force to exclude all opposition and realize their perfected model of warfare (The Gulf War Did not Take Place (GW)). Everywhere, unilaterality and the exclusion of the symbolic reign. The media no more create a community, Baudrillard says, than ‘the possession of a refrigerator or a toaster’ (RM, 171). As we silently gather round it at night, we can see his point: television is killing the art of symbolic exchange. We find in Baudrillard, therefore, a counter-intuitive image of a mediatized society of non-communication in which ‘people are no longer speaking to each other’, being ‘definitively isolated in the face of a speech without response’ (RM, 172). Only controlled, preprogrammed feedback is acceptable, in phone-ins, polls and letters that are a simulacrum of a response, reinforcing the media’s operation and functioning to censor anything that challenges their power (RM, 181). May 1968 provides proof of this process for Baudrillard (RM, 172-7). Far from spreading the revolutionary uprisings, he argues, the media transformed a living movement, with its own rhythm and time, into a media object and event, short-circuiting its occurrence. ‘Mass mediatization’ functions through the ‘imposition of models’, Baudrillard says, so the media administered ‘a mortal dose of publicity’ to the events (RM, 174), imposing the media’s own models of meaning, development and resolution, resulting in the revolution’s ‘decompression’, ‘asphyxiation by extension’ and ‘defeat’ (RM, 176). If, therefore, the revolution will be televised, is any symbolic co-optation of the media possible? Baudrillard finds it in the streets: the real revolutionary media during May were the walls and their speech, the silkscreen posteers and the hand-painted notices, as it was only there, in that immediate, reciprocal and external space, that ‘speech began and was exchanged’ (RM, 176). Transgressive, ephemeral, dualistic, both inviting and producing a response, these graffiti breach ‘the fundamental rule of non-response enunciated by all the media’ (RM, 183). In it, Baudrillard says, ‘an immediate communication process is rediscovered’ (RM, 182).

#### Symbolic exchange exists outside of the logics of production and representation—vote neg to refuse the aff’s attempt to accumulate meaning

**Robinson 12**

Andrew Robinson (political theorist and activist based in the US). “Jean Baudrillard: Symbolic Exchange.” Ceasefire Magazine. February 17th, 2012. <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-1/>

Symbolic exchange and initiation Symbolic exchange – the aspect of life which is missing today according to Baudrillard – is central to his entire theory. If simulation is the exchange of signs with signs, symbolic exchange is the exchange of signs with the real. Baudrillard treats the symbolic as an “outside” to representation, the code, value, production, the law, master-signification, and the unconscious – hence as radically other to most of the familiar institutions and roles of capitalist/statist systems. Baudrillard’s idea of symbolic exchange is loosely based on Marcel Mauss’s analysis of gifts in indigenous social life, though he takes it in a different direction from Mauss, using it to analyse what is missing in today’s capitalist societies. There were, according to Baudrillard, societies without the social. They existed without the kind of representational systems which create the appearance of social life in modernity. Instead, they were based on networks of symbolic ties. They were outside production because their social forms were instead based on excess, expenditure and the symbolic. Excess exists instead of surplus or accumulation. Nothing is taken from nature without being returned. They were neither societies of scarcity, nor did they limit their “production” to avoid a “surplus”. They were simply outside the logic of production. Symbolic exchange is fundamental to the nature of ‘society’ in such groups. People in indigenous groups are not simply born, biologically. They become part of society through initiation. This is a process marked by exchanges and rituals. Forms of marking, such as tattoos, turn people and the world into material for symbolic exchange. They then enter into an uninterrupted, ongoing process of exchange. According to Baudrillard, initiation is a second birth, into a symbolic order. It breaks the Oedipal nexus of natural birth. The whole body can be used in exchange. Initiation, torture, tattooing, as well as sexuality were used to perform symbolic exchange. The idea of seduction (more on this later) is closely linked to symbolic exchange. Seduction is a type of initiation. Those who ‘seduce’ someone become the second, initiatory parents. Initiation is a pure ‘event without precedent’ which is the beginning of a destiny. Destiny is taken to escape history, causality, determination and genesis, at least on the level of experience. It is something which ‘happens without your having anything to do with it’ – in other words, it is experienced as extra-subjective. Symbolic exchange allows people and objects to enter a realm of destiny, where things aren’t arbitrary. Destiny is distinct from chance, probability and the aleatory – which are central aspects of modernity. The chance happening, such as birth, does not create an event. A true event only occurs via a second birth or death. Only through true events do we attain intensity. Crucially, symbolic exchange establishes a relationship between signs and reality. It allows signs to “mean”. Reality is here conceived as subjective, experiential, and expressive. In one passage in The Consumer Society, Baudrillard identifies the symbolic with a childlike emotional response to a new object or gadget. Such a response is intense, ignorant of fashion, and disregarding of others’ demands for particular meanings. It is the opposite of how consumer society works. The introduction of combinations of elements, rules of the game and so on is seen as eliminating such libidinal investment of objects. Passion is replaced by indifferent fascination or curiosity. He also suggests there was initially an absence of reproducibility in indigenous society, to the point where the existence of two identical books is bewildering. Symbolic exchange also gives us a singularity or uniqueness. Symbolic exchange gives objects an individuality which rips them out of sign-, use- and exchange-value. Each object becomes unique, ambivalent and reciprocal or reversible with other objects. Initiation is based on the possibility for any system or category to overflow into others – to escape its path-dependency and jump tracks. It also removes the separation, and therefore the meaning, of things. This removal of separation causes an intense enjoyment. Indeed, Baudrillard sees this reversibility or ambivalence as the sole source of enjoyment. (Enjoyment should here be seen, as in Lacanian theory, as distinct from ‘pleasure’). Humour is a remnant of this kind of reversible enjoyment. There is also no bar between subject and object in symbolic exchange. The subject does not attempt to master the object, but rather, accepts being analysed by it in turn – a relation of reversibility. Similarly, humans and animals are part of an interchangeable cycle. Genders are reversible (it is modernity which strictly establishes gender binaries). According to Baudrillard, we should respect the inhuman. Cultures dismissed as fatalist actually find their law from the inhuman. Symbolic exchange also destroys the other cherished separations of modernity. Sexuality, for instance, does not exist outside modernity. Sex is simply part of a cycle of exchanges. Initiation is fundamentally a group, rather than a privatised or massified, phenomenon. It is a passage through the cycle of life and death, through a symbolic event in which one is reborn as a social being and hence enters the field of symbolic exchange. It summons away the splitting of life and death, and therefore fatality towards life. In the symbolic order, life is to be exchanged and returned, eventually returned to death. As a group event, it also separates a particular group from the whole of humanity. The specificity of a symbolic society also depends on a boundary against other groups, a “them and us”. This process is also not individualised, as in Oedipal psychology, but occurs through a collective movement of exchanges. Symbolic exchange is based on the pact, challenge or alliance, which are consciously artificial and initiatory. It is based on ritual defiance and obligation, rather than liberty; metamorphosis, rather than the accumulation of energy. Although it grounds an experience of things as meaningful, symbolic exchange is not heavy with meaning and truth. For Baudrillard, the most intense human experiences don’t come from bodies or from the natural. They come from artificial systems. Rituals produce ecstatic connections based on esoteric rules. They have no meaning. They instead introduce people into initiatory cycles or appearance and disappearance. Baudrillard argues that symbolic ritual is esoteric, whereas Christian ideas of love are exoteric. Symbolic exchange occurs as a light, superficial play of signs without meaning. This contrasts with later systems of emotional investment heavy with meaning. Rules are necessary to symbolic exchange, but are something people simply invent, with ‘the intensity and simplicity of child’s play’. Symbolic change is based on reversibility. Its structure is based on reciprocal exchange between peers rather than a master-signifier or ruling father-figure. It is thus ‘an autonomous principle of social organisation’ – a horizontal principle, compatible with autonomous groups. Baudrillard is here deeply critical of the Lacanian view on which he has otherwise drawn so extensively. He does not believe that social life requires a master-signifier. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups have access to the symbolic without passing through the mediation of the master-signifier. They instead ground the symbolic in the cycle of reversible exchanges. Real communication is reciprocal – it invites a response, and a stance of responsiveness or responsibility for the other. This reverses or undermines the linearity of time on which capitalism is grounded. It establishes time as cyclical instead of linear. This reversal is connected to the idea of destiny. If time runs in both directions – forward and backward – it is in a sense reversible. Modern culture only sees time moving forward. Baudrillard argues that the modern unconscious is arranged around the ideas of killing, devouring and possessing. The indigenous unconscious is instead arranged around the ideas of giving, returning and exchanging, which organise collective processes of exchange. These ideas assume a reversible, cyclical logic. Indigenous systems are also based on kinship and direct needs. The transition to consumer society occurs through the invention of artificial needs, akin to Barthes’s second-order significations. Despite its group-defining function, symbolic exchange is also defined in terms of the overcoming of separations, segmentations and boundaries. Symbolic exchange is a regulated play of signs and appearances, including ceremonies of metamorphosis. It doesn’t accumulate profits or meanings. It doesn’t alienate people from each other or the world. For Baudrillard, the symbolic also puts an end to all the other bars and splits. It puts an end to the ‘effect of the real’, the experience of real disjunctions based on categories. Symbolic exchange also refuses any separation of life and death. Life given over to death, or death given meaning for the living, are forms of symbolic exchange. It also does not know the nature-culture split, since the territory is different from the modern idea of nature. The relationship to the dead exists instead of alienation. In the west, people are alienated by internalising an abstract agency. The relation to the dead and with shadows or doubles instead occurs through a concrete connection, a ‘non-alienated duel-relation’. Death, seen in this way, is a kind of social openness, an undoing which breaks down social separations – perhaps even a form of reproduction prior to sexuality. This is similar to Bakhtin’s theory of the grotesque. In this process, parts of the body and of language are made autonomous, as separate agencies. This process overcomes the splits and separations which characterise modern thought. It multiplies one being into many others just as alive as the first. This is a process beyond the economic. The fusion of phenomena beyond the boundaries of categories creates a field of festivity, loss, and eroticism, instead of a field of general equivalence. It is also beyond science, because it involves contaminations and exchanges across categories. Life and death are exchangeable, rather than mutually exclusive. Meaning is mortal, but images, and seduction by images, are immortal. Ceremonies function as a kind of violence against meaning and against linear time. This is what makes them seductive. Ceremonies have a slowing effect, drawn from their connection to destiny. They are counterposed to spectacle and spectatorship. They are immanent to the experiences of participants, and work through power rather than pleasure. Baudrillard sees ceremony as operating at an extra-subjective level, creating zones of intensity which are not those of the ego. Rather than survival and existence, ceremony and destiny focus on appearance and disappearance, and metamorphosis. This is the field which is seductive, which creates the ‘scene’ of fantasy. It is not, Baudrillard argues, a transgression. The reversibility of indigenous cultures is dissimilar from the repression-liberation dynamic of repressive cultures. Things are reversed, not to overturn, but to cyclically return. The initiation governs our relationship to violence. Therefore, violence has become a ‘problem’ today, something that can’t be conceptualised. It is also a situation where collective rituals produce signs – rather than signs producing culture. For Baudrillard, symbolic exchange is fundamental to human psychology and existence. All differences are ultimately exchangeable. Reversibility or reciprocity never ends. Every discrimination, every creation of an unmarked term or a privilege, is imaginary. The term which is subordinated returns in greater force. Whereas the code (see below) is linear and repetitive, the symbolic is cyclical and reciprocal. The territory of the group is the site of a complete cycle of exchanges, such as cycles of wealth distribution, exchange of partners, and ritual exchanges – an indefinite cycle. Only once the territory is lost do people develop an unconscious instead. It is a homeplace, an ecological site to which the organism is densely connected. It is the site of exchanges between the organism and the ecosystem – an ecologically non-alienated site. This view is posited as a critique of ideas of liberation of desire and of deterritorialisation. For Baudrillard, a return to territory is instead what people secretly desire. The accursed share is the secret of symbolic exchange. This is a fragment of one’s own life which is given away, thereby entering cycles of giving, receiving and returning. According to Baudrillard, the accursed share cannot be breached or recuperated by the dominant order. It remains irreducible to it, and fatal to it. This, for Baudrillard, is the key to bringing down the system. Secrets are also central to symbolic exchange. Secrets do not conceal something specific, but rather, stand in the place which would show there is nothing to reveal. Secrets are seductive. They are very different from repressed content, which can be interpreted. Indigenous groups tend to confuse signifier and signified to the advantage of the signified content. In contrast, consumer society confuses them to the advantage of the signifier. Culture is fundamentally connected to initiation, secrets and symbolic exchange. Hence the loss of culture today.